Domestic Resource Mobilisation for Development in Pakistan by Qureshi, Sarfraz K. et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Domestic Resource Mobilisation for
Development in Pakistan
Sarfraz K. Qureshi and Musleh-Ud Din and Ejaz Ghani and
Kalbe Abbas
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Pakistan
1997
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6795/
MPRA Paper No. 6795, posted 19. January 2008 14:40 UTC
The Pakistan Development Review 
36 : 4 Part II (Winter 1997) pp. 891—912 
 
 
Domestic Resource Mobilisation for 
Development in Pakistan 
 
SARFRAZ K. QURESHI, MUSLEH-UD DIN, EJAZ GHANI, and KALBE ABBAS 
 
This paper examines the determinants of private, domestic, and household savings in 
Pakistan. The analysis shows that private savings can be expected to grow gradually as a 
result of rising per capita income, falling dependency burden, improved financial deepening, 
and macro stability. Bivariate causality tests between GNP and savings show that GNP 
causes both domestic and public savings. However, the causality test is inconclusive in the 
case of causation between GNP and private savings. This finding has important policy 
implication in the sense that once a virtual cycle succeeds in accelerating growth, saving 
would catch up with a lag. In this sense, financing of investment is not a major constraint. 
The paper underlines the following policy options: (i) a strong effort spread over tax policy 
(tax reforms as well as tax administration), expenditure restraint, effective expenditure 
management, and public sector corporate reforms should aim at raising public savings to 
about 6 percent of the GDP; (ii) the incentives for private savings in Pakistan need to be 
revamped. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The task of poverty alleviation and catching up with the fast-growing Asian 
countries requires Pakistan to target and achieve at least a 7 percent annual growth over the 
next 15 years.  The key question in this context is whether Pakistan can position itself in a 
policy and institutional sense to finance the needed investment through increased domestic 
savings without undue recourse to foreign savings which introduces an element of 
unsustainability. The analysis of Pakistan’s savings potential and how best it may be drawn 
on is a central issue at this time, since any optimistic scenario of future growth depends on 
a considerable increase in the national savings rate from its current low level.  The average 
saving rate over 1990-91 to 1995-96 has been only 14.7 percent of GDP.  It is essential to 
get this rate up to 20 percent and desirable to get it to 25 percent as soon as possible.  How 
may this be achieved is an issue that we address in this paper. 
A strategy to improve Pakistan’s saving rate needs to benefit from the recent 
insights in the saving, investment and growth literature. Tax and interest rate instruments 
are important policy tools but need to be a part of an overall policy package aimed at 
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fostering growth through improved productivity and financial liberalisation. The 
financial instruments requiring particular attention are a well functioning stock market, 
fully-paid compulsory pension and provident fund schemes with wide coverage and 
postal and national savings schemes which lower the transaction cost for savers 
emerging largely from geographical spread of post offices in rural areas whose savings 
need to be mobilised. 
Section 2 provides a discussion of the methodology of savings estimation and 
points out the weaknesses in savings data in Pakistan. The measurement problem should 
be kept in view while reviewing trends in Pakistan’s savings rates as well as Pakistan’s 
savings performance relative to other countries. Section 3 presents information on trends 
in savings, structure of savings and the saving performance of Pakistan relative to other 
countries. Section 4 presents an analysis of the determinants of savings. Section 5 
outlines elements of a strategy for obtaining higher savings in Pakistan. The final section 
summarises main conclusions. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY OF SAVING ESTIMATION AND 
MEASUREMENT BIASES IN OFFICIAL DATA 
ON SAVINGS IN PAKISTAN 
In the existing official methodology of national income accounting in Pakistan, 
national saving is estimated indirectly as a residual. The residual is computed at two 
stages. At the first stage, the difference between aggregate imports of goods and services 
(M) and aggregate exports of goods and services (X) yields estimates of foreign saving 
(F). At the second stage, national saving (S) is estimated as the difference between total 
investment (I) and foreign saving.    
National saving consists of public and private savings. Private saving (Sp) is 
estimated as the difference between national saving and public saving (Sg). Public saving 
is derived from budgetary accounts, which contain elements both from revenue and 
capital accounts of the budget and self-financing by public corporations, local bodies, 
and banking/insurance companies.  
Corporate saving (Sc) is derived simply by a factor income payments approach 
based on balance sheets of joint stock companies, i.e., the sum of depreciation and 
retained earnings. The difference between private saving and corporate saving yields 
household sector saving (Sh) in Pakistan.   
The above estimation of various forms of savings indicates that the estimates of 
national saving, in general, and household saving in particular, are susceptible to all the 
errors that occur in the figures of total investment and foreign savings, i.e., an 
underestimation of investment results in an underestimation of saving. 
In Pakistan, at present there are two official series of data on savings. National 
savings estimates prepared by Planning Commission (used also in the State Bank of 
Pakistan, Annual Report) and those by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) differ 
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mainly because of the different sources of foreign trade data used in the estimation of 
foreign savings. The trade figures used by Planning Commission are derived directly 
from the balance of payments data compiled by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), while 
the FBS series are based on their own compilation of foreign trade figures on customs 
data on physical movement of goods and services. Both measures are legitimate in the 
sense that payments data by the SBP capture the movement of funds which finance 
trade, while customs data by the FBS reflect more accurately the actual movement of 
goods and services in international trade. In principle, national accounts estimates 
should measure physical movements of goods and services, and therefore, national 
saving should be based on FBS data. But the main limitation of the FBS data is that it 
does not include public sector imports in its import figures. We use saving data compiled 
by the State Bank of Pakistan as the coverage of imports from this source is wider than 
that of Federal Bureau of Statistics saving series.  The magnitude of domestic savings, 
being a residual, is subject to the accuracy of the gross investment figures and the 
balance of payments statistics.  The exclusion of smuggling from balance of payments 
statistics introduces an element of error.  The less than satisfactory coverage of 
investment in the informal sector adds another element of error in the investment figures. 
Whether unrecorded investment in the informal sector equals the unrecorded savings in 
this sector is an open question on which no hard evidence is available. A recent study on 
savings in Pakistan [Hook (1997)] maintained that savings in the informal sector have 
been under-estimated by about 4 percent of gross domestic product. 
 
3.  COMPOSITION AND TRENDS IN SAVINGS RATES 
Pakistan’s saving performance is evaluated in two ways.  We provide information 
on relative saving and investment rates in Pakistan and a few other selected Asian 
countries.  We trace the trends in different measures of savings over time.  The sources 
of savings and how these have changed over time is also an important issue. 
Table 1 presenting investment and saving as percent of GNP for the period 1976 
to 1995 shows that Pakistan in both savings and investment is not well placed relative to 
most countries.  Pakistan has been investing a significantly lower percent of GNP than 
all countries except Bangladesh.  On the savings side, gross domestic saving rate of 
Pakistan at 11 percent of GNP is lower than all other countries except Bangladesh. 
Pakistan has not only under-saved and under-invested relative to successful 
countries in the region who had experienced sustained high growth, its saving 
performance has also not improved much over time. Table 2 presents data on saving 
rates on an annual basis for the period 1960-61 to 1995-96.1 
1Data on savings rates from 1947-48 to 1959-60 separately for West Pakistan (present Pakistan) are 
sketchy. A recent careful analysis of savings rates shows it to be rising from 2.0 percent in 1949-50 to 6.5 
percent in 1959-60 [Pervez Hasan (1997)]. 
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Table 1 
Investment and Savings Rates: 1976–1995 
Country 
Gross 
Investment 
Gross National 
Saving 
Gross 
Domestic 
Saving 
Net Factor 
Income 
Foreign 
Saving 
Gap: Dom: 
Saving Gross 
Investment 
Bangladesh 12.6 5.6 3.0 2.6 7.0 –9.6 
China 36.5 37.0 36.9 0.1 –0.5 0.5 
India 22.9 22.0 22.7 –0.8 1.1 –0.2 
Indonesia 29.5 27.4 31.7 –4.3 N.A. 2.2 
Korea 32.9 30.3 32.4 –2.0 2.3 –0.6 
Malaysia 32.7 30.1 35.6 5.5 N.A. 2.9 
Pakistan 17.9 15.9 11.0 4.9 2.1 –6.9 
Philippines 24.6 21.5 21.7 –0.3 3.4 –2.8 
Sri Lanka 24.9 12.3 14.1 –1.8 12.6 –10.8 
Taipei, China 24.9 31.8 30.7 1.0 –6.8 5.8 
Thailand 32.9 27.6 29.0 –1.4 N.A. –3.9 
Source: Andrew T. Hook (1997) Savings in Pakistan: Practice and Policy. State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi. 
Note:  N.A. denotes ‘not available’. 
 
For the period 1960-61 to 1995-96, domestic saving rates of 9.66 percent is low.  
A much more disturbing feature of the savings performance is that the saving rate has 
fallen over time from 13.54 percent during 1960s to 8.44 percent during 1970s. The 
savings improved slightly during 1980s and 1990s and was slightly higher than 1960s. 
There have also been large fluctuations in the saving rates.  Another disturbing feature is 
that national saving has been able to finance, on average, 3/4th of gross total investment 
in Pakistan during the last 25 years. In other words, 1/4th of total investment has been 
financed by foreign resources. Considering the fact that the era of concessionary loan 
flows is over, if this trend is allowed to continue, it will raise the already high 
outstanding debt and debt servicing liability. 
Private saving consists of household and corporate savings. Private saving as 
percentage of GDP (private savings rate) has also remained low and stagnant at around 
12 percent during the last 25 years. Household saving as percentage of GDP (household 
saving rate) reported in Table 2 presents a dismal picture. It remained abysmally low and 
stagnant around less than 11 percent during the last 25 years. The performance of the 
corporate sector saving has been very poor.  It has averaged at 1.31 percent of GDP 
during the last 25 years. Interestingly, it has registered some improvement in the 1990s 
as compared with the earlier years.   
Public savings as percentage of GDP (public savings rate) presents a dismal picture 
as it averaged 1.99 percent and 2.31 percent respectively during the 1960–1996 and 1991–
1996 period.  One of the prime reasons for the low and stagnant domestic saving rate in 
Pakistan has been the abysmally poor performance of public saving rate. Unless serious 
efforts are made to raise  public  saving  rate  in the neighbourhood of 6 to 7 percent and  
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Table 2 
Trends in Savings in Pakistan 
 (Percent of GDP) 
Years Public Savings 
Private 
Savings 
Household 
Savings 
Corporate 
Savings 
Domestic  
Savings 
1960-61 2.11 7.01 3.91 0.95 9.25 
1961-62 2.20 5.84 4.42 0.97 8.27 
1962-63 1.81 10.90 8.19 1.21 12.93 
1963-64 2.23 14.62 9.63 1.49 16.99 
1964-65 2.28 16.69 6.71 1.37 19.16 
1965-66 2.37 10.61 13.75 1.39 13.14 
1966-67 2.58 13.66 9.27 1.38 16.38 
1967-68 2.92 9.48 11.09 1.59 12.45 
1968-69 3.15 8.79 8.49 1.62 12.01 
1969-70 0.95 8.02 0.65 1.54 13.06 
1960-61 to 1969-70 2.26 10.53 7.57 1.41 13.54 
1970-71 0.74 7.74 6.47 1.26 12.95 
1971-72 –0.33 9.67 8.48 1.19 12.32 
1972-73 –0.47 11.18 9.60 1.58 10.00 
1973-74 –0.15 7.16 5.85 1.31 6.31 
1974-75 0.60 6.56 5.08 1.48 4.95 
1975-76 0.81 10.45 9.21 1.24 8.96 
1976-77 2.45 9.87 0.87 1.17 8.66 
1977-78 1.81 12.67 11.49 1.18 7.59 
1978-79 1.06 11.17 10.02 1.15 5.81 
1979-80 2.20 11.49 10.01 1.48 6.87 
1970-71 to 1979-80 0.87 9.80 7.71 1.30 8.44 
1980-81 4.17 9.25 7.78 1.46 6.34 
1981-82 3.35 9.18 7.58 1.60 8.13 
1982-83 1.27 14.72 13.05 1.67 8.38 
1983-84 2.02 11.70 10.06 1.64 7.65 
1984-85 0.38 12.55 12.15 0.40 6.71 
1985-86 1.71 13.18 12.62 0.56 8.78 
1986-87 0.49 16.48 15.44 1.05 12.28 
1987-88 1.33 12.30 11.35 0.95 10.56 
1988-89 0.19 13.89 13.03 0.86 10.44 
1989-90 2.84 11.35 10.15 1.20 11.75 
1980-81 to 1989-90 1.60 12.71 11.64 1.07 9.65 
1990-91 0.70 13.48 12.03 1.46 12.67 
1991-92 4.27 12.80 11.39 1.41 16.66 
1992-93 1.50 12.06 10.68 1.39 13.44 
1993-94 2.56 13.09 11.55 1.54 15.95 
1994-95 2.05 12.70 11.20 1.50 14.52 
1995-96 2.49 11.24 9.91 1.33 14.46 
1990-91 to 1995-96 2.31 12.43 10.99 1.43 14.67 
1960-61 to 1995-96 1.99 12.39 10.98 1.31 9.66 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report (Various Issues), Karachi. 
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private saving rate in the neighbourhood of 16 to 17 percent of GNP, Pakistan’s desire to 
raise saving rate closer to the average of developing countries (23 percent) will remain a 
distant dream. For Pakistan to join the rank of the “Asian Tiger”, a saving rate of more than 
35 percent is needed.  Given the current low rate of saving it is highly improbable that 
Pakistan will come even closer to attain the rank of the “Asian Tiger” in the distant future 
unless serious efforts are made to raise both public and private saving rates. 
Table 3 presents data on revenue and expenditure. A quick look reveals the 
factors behind the low and deteriorating public savings in Pakistan. While the 
development expenditure as a percent of GNP has been restrained, the current 
expenditure has increased sharply.  There has been no significant increase in the 
proportion of tax and non-tax revenue in GNP. The failure to institute a serious tax 
reform programme and to exercise fiscal restraint in Pakistan have jointly been 
responsible for the dismal performance of public savings. 
Table 4 summarises net financial balances of the private sector, the public sector, 
and the overall economy in Pakistan. It shows that public savings followed an upward 
trend during 1970-96. They reveal that annual average public savings were 0.8 percent 
of GDP in 1970s, which increased to 1.8 percent in 1980s and 2.3 percent of GDP in 
1990s. Conversely, public investment had declined from annual average 9.3 percent of 
GDP in 1970s to 9.2 percent in 1980s and 8.5 percent of GDP in 1990s. An upward 
trend in public savings and a downward trend in public investment had limited the 
worsening in the government net financial balance during the period 1970-96.  Table 4 
also shows that annual average net balance of the public sector improved from 8.5 
percent of GDP in 1970s to 7.4 percent in 1980s and 6.2 percent of GDP in 1990s. It 
should be noted, however, that public sector had always been getting an inflow of funds 
from the private sector. 
In Pakistan, private savings have been substantially higher than public savings 
throughout the period under consideration. They increased from an average of 9.6 
percent of GDP in 1970s to almost 12.5 percent of GDP in 1980s and 1990s. On the 
other hand, private investment expanded from the average of 7.0 percent of GDP in 
1970s to 9.6 percent in 1980s and 10.9 of GDP in 1990s. Consequently, the net 
financial balance of the private sector deteriorated from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1970s 
to 2.9 percent of GDP in 1980s. It improved somewhat in 1990s. The surpluses of 
the private sector were transferred to the public sector to meet its budgetary 
requirements.  
Table 4 also shows the evolution of overall net balance of Pakistan’s 
economy, which is identical to the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments. It shows that the overall net balance improved from an annual average of 
5.9 percent of GDP in 1970s to almost 4.5 percent of GDP during 1980s and 1990s.  
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4.  DETERMINANTS OF SAVINGS IN PAKISTAN 
In second section, evidence on main determinants of savings in East Asia was 
presented. In this section, we first provide a review of empirical literature drawing 
largely on previous studies in the context of Pakistan. We find that results are broadly 
consistent with standard economic theory. However, the statistical significance of some 
of the variables has been found to be weak.  Also the directions of relationship between 
growth and saving need to be examined. Due largely to this omission in previous 
literature, we provide further analysis on determinants of savings. We explicitly discuss 
the Ricardian Equivalence proposition in terms of the impact of changes in public 
savings on private savings and household savings. The specific issue addressed in this 
context is how much private savings would be displaced due to increase in public 
savings. 
 
4.1.  Review of Literature 
This section presents a brief review of the empirical literature on the behaviour of 
savings in the context of Pakistan’s economy. Qureshi (1981) investigated the relative 
explanatory power of permanent vs current income in explaining variation in the rate of 
household saving in Pakistan. The study showed that the permanent income model that 
emphasises short term adjustment lags between income and expenditure provided a 
much better explanation of the variation in household saving. The study also examined 
the effect of real interest rate on household saving and found a strong and positive 
relationship between these two variables. The study showed a negative impact of 
inflation on the rate of household saving in Pakistan. 
Khan (1988) and Khan et al. (1994) analysed the behaviour of savings in the 
context of McKinnon-Shaw model of financial repression. According to the McKinnon-
Shaw thesis, it is not the cost of capital but rather the availability of financial resources 
that constrain investment in financially repressed economies. Contrary to the 
conventional view, the McKinnon-Shaw model emphasises a positive relationship 
between investment and the real rate of interest. This is because an increase in the real 
rate of interest induces more savings which in turn raises the level of investment by 
relaxing the financial constraints. Both the studies found strong support for the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. 
Khan et al. (1994) examined the determinants of national saving rate in Pakistan 
in terms of a variety of factors that include income, real interest rate, dependency ratio, 
foreign capital inflow, foreign aid, changes in the term of trade, and openness of the 
economy. The study found a strong and positive effect of per capita GNP on national 
savings. However, the study reported an insignificant impact of the growth rate of real 
income on national savings. The study showed that real interest rate, change in the term 
of trade, and openness of the economy positively influence national saving. Both debt to 
GNP ratio and dependence rate were found to have an adverse impact on national 
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saving. The study showed that foreign capital inflow discouraged national saving in the 
current period. However foreign capital inflow was found to have a positive influence on 
national saving with lags of one and two periods.  
Finally, Hussain (1996) explored the determinants of private saving in terms of 
demographics, growth, and financial deepening. The study estimated a long run 
equilibrium relationship for the period 1970–1993. This relationship indicated that the 
private saving rate cointegrates with the financial deepening variable and the time trend. 
Hence, long run movement in the rate of private saving in Pakistan may be explained by 
long run movements in financial deepening and the time trend. To the extent that the 
variables not included in the estimation, such as net wealth and net government debt, are 
correlated with the time trend, the results appear to suggest that these variables also 
influenced long run movements in the rate of private saving. Finally, the study found 
that demographics did not influence private saving rate in Pakistan.    
 
4.2.  Determinants of Private, Domestic, and Household Savings 
This section provides an empirical assessment of the role of income, public 
saving, real interest rate, financial deepening, foreign capital inflows, and other 
demographic and structural factors in the determination of private, domestic, and 
household savings in Pakistan. Regression equations have been estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) for private saving, domestic saving, and household saving for the 
period 1961–1996. The estimated equations are reported in Table 5 Equation 1 explains 
private saving in terms of public saving, GNP, Financial Deepening (measured as a ratio 
of M1 to GNP),  ratio of value added in agriculture to GDP (VAGDP), foreign capital 
inflows, and real interest rate. In this equation, GNP, financial deepening, and real 
interest rate positively influence the dependent variable, while public saving, foreign 
capital inflows,  and ratio of value added in agriculture to GDP have a negative impact 
on private saving.  Equation 2 explains domestic saving in terms of GNP, financial 
deepening, ratio of value added in agriculture to GDP, foreign capital inflow and real 
interest rate. In this equation, GNP, financial deepening, and ratio of value added in 
agriculture to GDP positively influence the dependent variable. Both GNP and foreign 
capital inflow are statistically significant while ratio of value added in agriculture to 
GDP and financial deepening are statistically insignificant. Real interest rate has a 
negative but statistically insignificant co-efficient. Equation 3 explains household saving 
in terms of public saving, GNP, real interest rate, foreign capital inflows and 
dependency ratio. In this equation, both public saving and foreign capital inflows 
negatively influence the dependent variable while GNP, real interest rate and 
dependency ratio have a positive impact on household saving. All the variables except 
dependency ratio are statistically significant in this equation. 
Public saving is included as an explanatory variable in the equations for private 
and household savings to test Ricardian Equivalence. The co-efficient of public saving  
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has a negative sign in the equations for private and household savings, confirming that 
public savings do crowd out private and household savings. However, the low 
magnitude of this co-efficient indicates that public savings have not fully crowded out 
private savings.2 For example in equation 1 of Table 5 an increase of one rupee in public 
savings leads to a reduction of 48 paisa in private savings. Thus the Recardian 
Equivalence proposition does not appear to hold fully in the context of Pakistan’s 
economy.  
We have also tested for the direction of causation between GNP and private 
saving, domestic saving, and public saving in turn. Appendix I reports the results of 
Engle-Granger Causality tests.  The results show that GNP causes both domestic and 
public savings. However, the causality test is inconclusive in the case of causation 
between GNP and private saving. This finding has important policy implication in the 
sense that once a virtuous cycle succeeds in accelerating growth, savings would catch up 
with a lag. In this sense, financing of investment is not a major constraint. It would get 
relaxed with time as has been the case of many East Asian countries.  
 
5.  STRATEGY AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
INCREASING SAVINGS 
There are two issues that need to be addressed at the very outset.  First, the target 
level of domestic savings required to finance the investment needs for achieving the 
objective of 7 to 8 percent growth in the economy needs to be known. This exercise 
requires, among other things, the expected sectoral composition as different sectors vary in 
their capital requirements and expected changes in the efficiency of investment would in 
future years. In view of the current infrastructural constraints, it is expected that future 
investment would be characterised with a high level of Incremental Capital Output Ratio 
(ICOR) as investments in the infrastructural sectors has a higher ICOR than most other 
sectors.  If the improvements in the efficiency of investments does not fully offset the 
impact of larger required investments in infrastructures, it is expected that ICOR would 
increase over time in Pakistan. 
Table 6 presents ICOR measures for Pakistan, India and a few other countries. 
The countries in South-East Asia had a strong economic reforms programme which had 
a favourable impact on the efficient use of resources.  Despite increased efficiency of 
investment, the ICOR have been in excess of 4.  It, therefore, appears that given the high 
infrastructural needs of the Pakistani economy, it is quite probable that Pakistan’s ICOR 
would rise to about 4.5 over the next 10 years or so.  Given the target growth rate of 7 
percent, it implies that investment rate needs to increase to over 30 percent.  Assuming 
some recourse to foreign savings, the domestic savings rates would need to rise to about 
28 percent in the medium to long-term from the current rate of 14.46 percent in 1995-96. 
2Notice  that the negative coefficient may be upward biased due to errors of observation in the savings 
data. 
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Table 6 
Increased Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) Measures for Pakistan, 
 India and East Asian Countries 
 (Average Values) 
 1975–80 1981–85 1986–90 1991–95 1975–95 
Pakistan 3.16 2.78 3.31 5.11 3.59 
China 0.82 3.54 5.02 3.48 3.44 
Indonesia 3.07 5.59 5.27 4.98 4.73 
Malaysia 3.20 4.29 7.21 4.34 4.76 
Thailand 3.59 4.76 3.29 4.88 4.13 
India 4.70 4.16 4.02 4.65 4.35 
 
Whether such an increase in domestic savings rates is feasible and, if so, what 
policy steps need to be taken is the issue we turn to.  We had shown that in East-Asia, 
some countries that had low saving rates initially were successful in raising savings to 
the required high levels. This was achieved by a mix of policies aimed directly at 
mobilising savings and by the initiation of a virtuous growth-saving circle by first 
putting in place a strong structural reforms programme that had increased efficiency of 
resource use and had resulted in sustained high growth. The accelerated growth had 
Granger-caused increased savings with a lag. 
What events and/or policies might contribute to an increase in the savings rate? 
Among the possible candidates are: 
 (i) An increase in per capita income over time. Though Khan et al. (1994) report 
a strong and positive effect, it is noteworthy that although per capita incomes 
has risen by about 150 percent since the beginning of the 1960s the average 
savings ratio has shown no clear upward trend, raising the possibility that 
though short term increases in income coincide with increases in savings, this 
relationship is less in evidence, if at all, in the longer run. 
 (ii) An increase in the growth rate of per capita income. This variable, which 
seems to have played a role in some developing countries, did not have 
explanatory power in the cited Khan et al. study. 
 (iii) The real interest rate is other possible influence. The magnitude of its possible 
effect needs attention. 
 (iv) Trade and openness were reported by Khan et al. to have positive effects. 
This may be a good omen for Pakistan as it moves towards a more open 
economy. Foreign capital inflow has a reported negative effect in the current 
period though a positive one with lags of one and two years. 
 (v) Household savings have been positively related to the dependency ratio.  An 
increasing dependency ratio indicates a higher burden on the working 
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generation, increasing the need for retirement saving.   
 (vi) The level of financial deepening in the economy has a positive impact on 
savings. Thus savings rate is likely to improve as the economy achieves a 
greater level of financial deepening. 
 (vii) As for the structural effects, share of agriculture in GDP may be related to 
savings, as confirmed in this study but without statistical significance.  The 
impact of this variable thus remains to be seen as well. 
Most of the factors indicated above would raise the domestic savings rates 
gradually over time.  The gradual projected increase in the saving rate would not suffice 
to finance the investment needs.  A strong action on both the public and private saving 
front is, therefore, needed. 
 
Policy Options 
 1. Public savings in Pakistan have been low and have declined over time.  A 
strong effort spread over tax policy (tax reforms as well as tax 
administration), expenditure restraint, effective expenditure management and 
public sector corporation reforms should aim at raising public savings to 
about 6 percent of GDP.  Higher public savings would depress, by a third, 
private savings through a Ricardian equivalence effect. On balance, an 
increase of domestic savings by 4 percent of GDP should be a significant step. 
The materialisation of increased public savings requires a strong public policy 
response. The only silver lining is that some countries had succeeded in this 
area. 
 2. The incentives for private savings in Pakistan need to be revamped.  The 
paucity of long-term saving instruments, such as provident funds, life 
insurance and mutual funds has hindered the channelling of savings in 
productive uses. Markets in long-term saving instrument have been dominated 
by the public sector.  The allocation of portfolios is heavily regulated which 
has resulted in the use of funds in areas of low returns. There is a need to 
introduce flexibility to enable actors to respond to market developments and 
not be bound by government dictate. 
 3. The provident fund system in Pakistan provides defined-contribution 
retirement schemes for not more than 6 percent of the labour force.  Public 
sector employees receive an additional budget-financed government pension.   
In addition to policies aimed at increasing the rate of voluntary saving, the 
Government needs to adopt measures to generate involuntary saving through mandatory 
pension schemes.  There are two types of such schemes: unfunded social security or pay 
as you go (PAYG) schemes; and fully funded pension plans. While the social security  
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systems of Europe and the United States are characterised by PAYG scheme, Japan, 
Malaysia, and Singapore have introduced fully funded mandatory pension plans.  The 
impact of compulsory pension plans on aggregate saving depends on the extent to which 
they substitute for voluntary saving.  Empirical evidence on the impact of pension funds 
on aggregate saving is generally mixed.  For example, results for the United States show 
that unfunded social security had increased long-term saving and investment by only 
modest amounts.  Empirical evidence for other industrial countries shows little or no 
effects of unfunded social security on contemporaneous private saving levels. In 
contrast, econometric evidence on Singapore’s fully funded central Provident Fund 
shows that it has stimulated aggregate saving.  Similarly, empirical evidence for Chile 
suggests that the substitution of fully funded for PAYG plans has contributed to Chile’s 
large increase in private saving. It should be noted that increase in private savings in 
Chile occurred after a long time lag. Pakistan should introduce mandatory pension 
schemes with a very broad employee coverage in the private sector.  In Pakistan, there is 
a need to improve the credit market to enable contribution of the provident fund system 
to borrow as and when they need to remove their liquidity constraints. This should lead 
to lesser withdrawal of funds from the provident fund system by its contributors who 
forego high returns from accumulation from provident fund only to meet short-term 
needs. 
  
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Domestic savings in Pakistan have been low and have risen quite slowly.  Public 
savings have been the major problem area in the past.  An econometric analysis of 
private savings determinants shows that we can expect private savings to grow gradually 
as a result of rising per capita income, falling dependency burden, improved financial 
deepening and macro stability.  If public savings remain low, private savings would not 
suffice to finance the high growth target needed to eradicate poverty as well as improve 
the general living standard.  Part of the problem of a low savings rate would be solved if 
a virtuous cycle is created whereby high GDP growth contributes to an acceleration in 
the growth rate of savings. 
The most promising strategy for Pakistan to raise its domestic saving rate is to 
raise public saving through tax and expenditure reforms, introduction of extensive 
compulsory forced saving schemes and opening of the private sector to provide financial 
instruments for long-term savings. 
 The development of a market for the long-term saving instruments can serve two 
major objectives.  First, the efficient use of invisible funds can be promoted if 
government does not use funds mobilised to finance its fiscal deficit and/or its 
unproductive portfolio of public sector projects.  The recent improvement in this area 
should be taken to its logical conclusion wherein resources raised through provident 
fund, insurance and mutual funds are allowed to be allocated to their best uses.  Second, 
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the National Provident Fund (NPF) mechanism has the potential to increase national 
savings only when certain conditions are met.  First, the mandated savings must be 
beyond the level individuals would have voluntarily chosen to save.  Second, individuals 
should not be allowed to find ways to evade the discipline imposed by forced savings 
through such means as additional borrowings.  In this context, it is important to improve 
the functioning of credit market. Third, the government must not offset this saving by 
running a larger deficit.  Indeed, there is a danger that the availability of continuous flow 
of funds through the government-controlled NPF mechanism may soften government’s 
budget constraint, and this in turn could result in the selection of projects which do not 
pass the test of social benefit-cost analysis. 
It should not be assumed that the introduction of the NPF will automatically result 
in increased private savings, let alone, in increased aggregate domestic savings.  This is 
especially the case when a transition is being made from the PAYG to the NPF system, 
as those with claims on the system before transition would need to be compensated. 
Paying compensation would have a negative impact on government saving. 
APPENDIX I 
 
Savings and Growth: Causality Tests 
The Appendix I reports the results of bivariate causality tests between GNP and 
private saving, domestic saving, and public saving in turn. A variable Xt is said to cause 
a variable Yt in the Granger sense if the forecast for Yt improves when lagged Xt’s are 
included in the regression. We employ the Engle-Granger Error Correction approach to 
test for the existence of a causal relationship. Prior to estimating an Error Correction 
Model (ECM), tests for the existence of unit roots were conducted for the time series of 
GNP, private saving, domestic saving, and public saving. The following table reports the 
results from Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) t-test. It is clear from these tables that the 
hypothesis of a unit root without trend is accepted for all the variables. Next, we tested 
for cointegration between GNP and the three categories of savings in turn.  
 
Results of Augmented Dickey Fuller t-Test 
Period Variable 
t-Statistic 
(Without Trend) 
t-Statistic 
(With Trend) 
LPS –0.8739 –2.4576 
LPBS –1.8978 –2.3498 
LDS   0.1275 –1.5762 
1961–1996 
LGNP –0.2862 –3.6698 
Notes: (1) For t-statistic without trend, Mackinnon critical values are –3.6353, –2.9499 and 2.6133 
respectively at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance. The corresponding critical 
values for t-statistic with trend are –4.2505, –3.5468 and –3.2056. 
 (2) LPS, LPBS, LDS, and LGNP respectively denote logarithms of private, public, and domestic 
savings and GNP. 
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The following table reports the cointegrating equations.  
Engle—Granger Co-integration Test 
Period Co-integration Equations Dickey Fuller Test CRDW 
 
 
1961–96 
LDS   = 1.518 + 0.944 LGNP 
LGNP = 2.324 + 0.987 DS 
LPS = –2.276 + 1.01 LGNP 
LGNP = 2.798 + 0.935 LPS 
LPBS = –13.899 + 1.701 LGNP 
LGNP = 10.766 +0.193 LPBS 
–2.66 
–2.73 
–4.68 
–4.60 
–2.63 
1.52 
2.01 
2.02 
2.04 
1.99 
2.16 
2.04 
 
Having analysed the time series properties of the relevant variables, the following 
equations have been estimated for the three categories of savings. 
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where L is the lag operator.  
 
The table given below provides a summary of the causality tests. The F-test 
shows that GNP causes both domestic and public savings. However, the result is 
inconclusive in the case of private savings. 
 
Direction of Causation Based on F-Test 
Variable 1961–96 
DS on GNP 2.89* 
GNP on DS 0.71 
PS on GNP 0.43 
GNP on PS 0.42 
PBS on GNP  6.77* 
GNP on PBS 1.10 
 
Chart of Direction of Causation between Savings and Income 
Period From    To 
 
1961–96 
  
GNP  ==>  DS 
GNP  --/--  PS 
GNP  ==>  PBS 
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